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Degree of Master of Arts
(in Global Policy)
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The concept of “middle power country” existed since several hundred years ago
introduced by European philosophers and political scientists. The definition was proposed
by many scholars and used by countries in many different status, one specific definition of
“middle power” was not set until current days. The characteristics of a “middle power
country” range from economic status, and political system, to patterns of diplomacy. By
current broad definition, almost 80 percent of the countries in the world can fit into one or
more categories of a “middle power country.”
The purpose of this paper is to depict the importance of middle power countries,
and narrow down the definition and characteristics of them by analyzing the case study of
South Korea and its diplomacy in Central Asia. It is necessary to narrow the definition of
“middle power” to evaluate what constitutes a country as “middle power.” Middle power
countries matter in the international relations as middle power countries hold pivotal
positions when regional or world super power states make decisions. As diffusion of power
becomes one of the global trends in the 21 st century, clearer definitions of power structure
of countries are needed to be redefined.

This thesis analyzes the nature of middle power countries and shared
characteristics of them. Using variables such as diplomatic policy, security, foreign direct
investment, and trade, I systematically analyze South Korea’s status as a middle power
country. Using data from South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports and scholarly
articles on middle power and Central Asia, I verify the relevance of studying the
relationship between South Korea and Central Asian republics. This thesis concludes with
the fact that middle power countries are defined by the four selected variables: diplomatic
policy, security, foreign direct investment, and trade. The thesis also proves that South
Korea performs qualifications of middle power country regardless of the regions and
countries it deals with.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since 2011, South Korea has been holding “Caravan events” in Central Asia to
promote South Korean interests in the region. From March 28, 2016 until April 1, 2016, the
sixth and the largest-ever Caravan event was held in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. This event
aimed to promote cooperation between South Korea and Central Asia in economics,
business, and cultural exchange. South Korea put significant resources in this event,
sending over 100 government officials and representatives to Central Asia to meet with
Central Asian counterparts, and working to deepen cooperation strategies. It is not
immediately apparent why it is in South Korea’s strategic interests to spend their limited
diplomatic resources on Central Asia. Neither scholars of South Korea nor the South Korean
public focus on the region as a key to a prosperous and secure future. And yet, the last
decades have seen an increasing focus in South Korean foreign policy on Central Asia. This
thesis investigates that focus, and in doing so brings to light broader lessons about the
efficacy and limits of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy.
The Caravan events are a part of South Korea’s broader Eurasia Initiative to deepen
diplomatic ties and enhance mutually beneficial economic trade. Currently South Korea and
Central Asia cooperate in many different projects including development in energy,
resources, infrastructure building, agriculture and information technology. Based on
complementary economic characteristics, South Korea and Central Asia are developing a
robust cooperative relationship. Why South Korea became interested in Central Asia and
put effort into building collegial relations with the region are worth investigating.
1

The purpose of this thesis is thus threefold. First, to analyze existing diplomatic
relationships between South Korea and Central Asia; Second, to define Korea as a middle
power country; Third, to verify if South Korea’s engagement in Central Asia confirms or
challenges the existing definition of middle power countries in the literature. Current
definitions range from narrow to very broad. A middle power country could encompass all
countries that are neither super power nor failed/failing states. This definition
encompasses 20 out of 178 countries which is about 88% of all countries. While these
countries are in the “middle,” this very broad definition does not take into account the
more important part of the moniker: “power”. Super powers and failing or failed states are
comparably easier to identify depending on their governance, economy, and their overall
development statuses. But it is unclear and vague to identify what countries in the middle
have characteristics of power which have strong diplomacy, use of soft power, located
between strong countries, and have robust economic trade among all the countries that are
not super power and failing/failed states. Middle power countries and their roles must
matter in international relations and yet a clear and obvious definition of a middle power
country have not been determined. Therefore, this project seeks to further clarify the
definition of middle power through an explanation of the relationship between South Korea
which is now a middle power and Central Asia.
South Korea is typically defined as a middle power country. It is not a super power
country like the United States or China but neither is it a small state incapable of individual
policy (Brzezinski, 1997). The range of determinants to segregate countries into different
categories of power structures vary depends on many different characteristics such as
military capability, size of economy, and its behavior in the world politics. South Korea is
2

currently defined as a middle power country based on its relationship with geographical
neighbors, China, Japan, and the United States. Because these three countries are not the
only countries that South Korea interacts with, its relationships with other countries that
South Korea interacts need to be taken into account in defining South Korea as a middle
power country.
Central Asia is an appropriate region to examine South Korea’s diplomacy trends
and its characteristics of middle power country for three reasons. First is timeliness. South
Korea has recently been trying to develop its relations with Central Asian republics by
increasing the amount of trade and cultural exchange. Second, South Korea and Central
Asia relations allow an explanation of middle power diplomacy outside of a great power
context. South Korea does have a large amount of trade and cultural exchange with China
and Japan, but they are necessarily mediated by regional security and balance-of-power
concerns. South Korea’s relations with Central Asian republics are less affected by regional
super powers. It will be profitable to demonstrate that South Korea’s trends of diplomacy
and relations with other countries fit into middle power countries’ profile even the
relations are only subtly affected by regional super powers. Lastly, until now, South Korea
has been evaluated according to its behaviors dealing with countries from similar region,
East Asia and Southeast Asia. Therefore, analyzing South Korea’s diplomatic trends and its
projections for the future relationship with Central Asia will help analyze how South Korea,
as a middle power, projects its interest in economy and security. Since current literature’s
definition and characteristics of “middle power country” is very broad and vague, analyzing
South Korea’s middle power country characteristics will make it possible to further specify
the definition of middle power country.
3

Chapter 2 reviews current literature’s definition of middle power countries and its
characteristics. The middle power country definition is applied to South Korea and will be
analyzed under what circumstances South Korea is qualified as a middle power country.
Chapter 3 explains the historical relationship between South Korea and Central Asia from
the late 1930s until present. Chapter 4 and 5 analyzes the current South Korea’s
relationship with Central Asia using changes in trade amount, soft power exchange, and
analysis of South Korean government documents on South Korea-led initiatives and
bilateral relationships with the five Central Asian republics. Through my analysis of South
Korea and Central Asia’s current relationship, this paper aims to generalize South Korea’s
qualifications as a middle power country beyond the geographical limits in East Asia and its
relationship with regional neighbors, China, Japan, and the United States.

4

CHAPTER 2
CURRENT MIDDLE POWER LITERATURE AND DEFINITION

The concept of middle power started in medieval period in Italy by writers such as
Thomas Aquinas, Giovanni Botero, and Bartolus de Saxoferrato (Holbraad, 1994). These
scholars recognized the different kinds and power structure of states such as which
countries get to tell other countries what they want them to do, and which countries have
to listen to stronger countries to sustain themselves and thought it was worth looking at
the dimensions more closely. Even though there were centuries of time between the three
scholars and the times they were living, the ideas they talk about middle power are similar.
Botero’s explanation of a middle-sized states sums up the prevalent idea of middle power
in the medieval period. Botero states:

Middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed neither to violence
by their weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth and power being
moderate, passions are less violent, ambition finds less support and license less
provocation than in large States. Fear of their neighbors restrains them, and even if
feelings are roused to anger they are more easily quieted and tranquility restored…
Yet although this mediocrity is more conducive to the preservation of an empire
than excessive power, middle-sized states do not last long if their leaders are not
content but wish to expand and become great, and, exceeding the bounds of
mediocrity, leave behind also those of security (Frace 1975, Holbraad 1994).
According to Botero, the idea of middle-sized states is defined as countries that are
moderate, less violent, and supportive of the great powers. They are vulnerable in the
sense that can be relatively easily conquered by great powers and have potential to be
readily swayed by outside influences. However, middle power countries do not work solely
in subordination to the goals of great powers. They can also be powerful, autonomous, and
5

capable in creating their own individual policies and diplomatic relations with other
countries to pursue their agendas. In the case of South Korea and its newly formed
cooperative relations with Central Asian republics serve as an example of a middle power
country with its independent behaviors. This proves that middle power countries do not
necessarily act within sphere of great powers but they project their influence to the
countries of their choice.
Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, also known as Abbé Mably, who was a French philosopher
also published his work in 1757 about middle power (Holbraad, 1994). Mably’s argument
is as follows: “the interest of middle-sized countries is to leave themselves recommendable
during peace; that is to maintain the division between the great powers. The middle
powers also flatter their passions by having negotiations driven with equivocal manner.
Through the conversations, the middle powers inject their views into other parties in
negotiations and give hopes to all the parties without taking any decided engagement.” 1
Understanding middle power’s behaviors and the fact that middle powers use diplomacy
and negotiations to achieve their political goals has been argued since the 1700s. Mably’s
explanation of middle-sized countries is done in the context of great powers and not
analyzed as independent behaviors. This is why traditional explanation and definition of
middle power are insufficient. Current middle power countries can be identified by their
independent actions, policies, and development of diplomatic relations with other
countries. The behaviors of middle power countries are not necessarily dependent on its
relationship or comparison to great powers.

1

Translated from French by the author.
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Both Botero and Mably describe the characteristics of middle-sized states based on
their characteristics and the way they behave with the great powers. The advantage of
middle-sized states compared to great powers is that they are less aggressive, prefer
negotiations or diplomacy, and supportive of great powers. The disadvantage of middlesized states is that they are vulnerable and easily dominated by stronger states. As Mably
says, middle-sized states express their positions about international issues that matter, but
they do not directly get involved which alludes the fact that middle-sized states can express
their stance and suggest, but when it comes to make a decision, it will depend on great
powers.
Since the medieval period, the concept of middle-sized states or middle power existed
in Europe. The concept evolved over time and now the term is used not only in Europe but
also all over the world. The distinction between middle power and great power is clearer
now than before in many aspects and it is worthwhile to analyze how the concept has
evolved.
The modern day ranking of countries started at the end of the First World War.
During the World War I, creation of Triple Entente and Triple Alliance, clear formation of
alliance system among countries was established. By the time when the World War I ended
on November 11, 1918, winners and losers of the war became clear which led to a definite
division of stronger and weaker power countries. Until then, regional super powers existed
such as Germany in Europe, and China in Asia. But during the First World War, the majority
of the world took sides of either Allies or The Central Powers. After the First World War,
ranking of countries became one of the ways to differentiate one from another and it marks
the beginning of ranking as a strategy of diplomacy (Holbraad, 1994). This strategy of
7

ranking gave stronger states leverage to manipulate weaker states to achieve their
priorities. The League of Nations was established in January 1920 after the Frist World War
and as a result of the Paris Peace Conference. Even though the primary purpose of The
League of Nations was keeping world peace, it was created by the winners of the First
World War which were the dominant power at that time. The Council of Ten which was a
committee within The League of Nations, was the congregation of the most influential
members led by France, Britain, and the United States (Holbraad, 1994). After the Second
World War, The League of Nations was succeeded by the United Nations. Like the UN, The
League of Nations was created by the winners of the Second World War. The United
Nation’s version of The Council of Ten is the United Nations Security Council composed of
five permanent members and ten temporary members. The primary purpose of the United
Nations Security Council is “maintenance of international peace and security (United
Nations Security Council website).”
The creations of both the League of Nations and the United Nations were done by
the winners of two major World Wars, and these are examples of relatively stronger
countries get the ruling power over weaker countries. The winners get to rule the world as
the great powers and the losers become followers. However, there has always been more
sophisticated systems in rankings of countries even though often times they are not
succinct and not clearly articulated. This is where middle power countries take place. As
Botero and Mably explained, middle power countries express their opinions about
international issues without getting directly involved in the situations. They also use
negotiations and diplomacy rather than military force to achieve their priority goals.
Botero and Mably’s analysis of middle power countries continue to hold until these days.
8

Although the basic analysis holds until now, it is necessary to verify if the analysis fits into
all the countries without exceptions and in different countries. Middle power countries
matter nowadays even more so than the medieval era because of diffusion of power that
we are experiencing now and stronger influence that middle power countries can have on
great powers.
Even though the middle power countries are not the great powers that make final
important decisions of the world issues and have leading influence on many other
countries, middle power countries matter (Cooper, 1997; Holbraad, 1984; Hundt, 2011;
Jordaan, 2003; Potter, 2015; Kasmi, 2017; Neack, 2017). First, middle power countries
arguably have leverage to influence great powers. Second, middle power countries have
developed competitive economic capabilities that can compete and establish robust trade
relations with great power countries. Third, middle power countries have strong
diplomacy. Even though middle powers are strong and capable of sustain themselves
economically, socially and militarily, compared to great power countries, their military
capacity is relatively weak. Therefore, middle power countries tend to pursue strong and
influential diplomacy rather than strong military.
South Korea, for example, is classified as a middle power country. In the regional
politics in East Asia, South Korea has responsibility for and leverage on decision making
processes. South Korea not only neighbors North Korea that is causing a tremendous
amount of uncertainty and instability of the region, but also it is a buffer zone for both great
powers, China and the United States. Neither of these great powers want to lose their
ideological and economical influence in East Asia and South Korea stands in the center of
that tension. Another example of influential and important middle power is Australia, also
9

located geographically and ideologically located between China and the United States. Its
economic status represented as GDP and GNI has grown up since the past, giving it more
independence and flexibility in foreign affairs. Therefore, Australia is another example of a
middle power country that fits the traditional and current explanations of middle power.
As the influence and importance of middle power countries grow(Jordaan, 2003;
Lee, 2012), it is necessary to understand the behaviors of middle power and make clearer
definition of middle power countries. Current literature develops definitions and
qualifications about middle power countries. Few countries are classified as strong power
states and unstable states like Syria and Afghanistan are classified as weak countries. This
leaves us that most countries in that are not very strong and not struggling through
ongoing wars can be classified as a “middle power” country. At its broadest, middle power
countries are defined as those with “sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own
without the need of help from others” (Shin, 2016). More specifically, scholars identify
middle power countries as those that tend to show the trends of system supporter,
network builder, security provider, a country with strong diplomacy, catalyst, facilitator,
manager and mediator roles (concepts discussed further below). However, these are too
many categories to define a concept: the concept is overdetermined.
To understand the roles of middle power countries in international relations and
how they actually affect relations with great powers, it is necessary to further formulate the
definition of a middle power country. Since the middle ages, the concept of middle-sized
states was studied by scholars. Nowadays it became a concept of middle power or middle
power country and the concept is still analyzed by scholars. But because middle power
countries are geographically located all over the world and based on their neighboring
10

countries and the middle power’s relationship with regional great power countries, the
behaviors of middle powers vary.
Current literature’s characterization of middle power can be categorized into three
big groups: Geographical and economic factor as a factual characteristic, soft power and
diplomacy as usages of power resources and policy characteristic, and provider of security
and international order as a conduct of international cooperation characteristic. The idea of
a middle power country was established in 16 th century in Italy by Italian philosopher
Giovanni Botero who said that middle powers “are exposed neither to violence by their
weakness nor to envy by their greatness, and their wealth and power being moderate,
passions are less violent, ambition finds less support and license less provocation than in
large states” (O’Neil, 2017). On the behaviors of middle power countries, Spero additionally
posits that middle powers don’t have choices about the kind of international system in
which they compete, cooperate or confront (Spero, 2009). Spero also points out that even
though it is difficult for middle powers to choose with whom they want to cooperate and
compete, their presence and impact on security dilemmas can be significant for great
powers (Spero, 2009). South Korea is an example of this security dilemma. Being located
between two great powers, the United States and China, South Korea cannot choose who it
wants to cooperate or compete. Both the United States and China are significantly
important trade partners of South Korea. South Korea has been in a defense alliance
relation with the United States. However, economic interdependence and fear of economic
backlash plays an increasingly important role in South Korea’s stances between the United
States and China. To generalize the trend of rising middle power country phenomenon, Lee
articulates that the diffusion of power trend in the world and diversified goals of
11

international system have triggered “secondary powers to seek policy responses and
initiatives in niche areas where they have the advantage” (Lee, 2012). As mentioned before,
from the medieval era until now, the concept of middle power was studied and analyzed by
many scholars. But it has yet to be solidified into one generalizable definition.
Current literature’s definition of middle power countries is different depending on
scholars, and it is abstract and not clearly defined. The description covers general idea of
middle power and it almost fits into most of the states that are not obvious great power or
failing states. The first characteristic of middle power is geographical, economic and factual
characteristic. Lee talks about middle power country with economic capabilities along with
the size of population and military capabilities. He addresses a middle power country as a
“positional approach locating a middle power at the middle point in range of bigness and
smallness in terms of population, economic strength and complexity, and military
capability” (Lee, 2012). Lee also claims that a middle power country is physically and
ideologically located between great powers (Lee, 2012). This is a description that fits to
countries like South Korea, Indonesia, Australia, and Canada and their physical and
ideological location. South Korea, Indonesia, Australia and other emerging middle power
countries like Vietnam and Philippines are located in Asia-Pacific region where China is a
great power in both economically and ideologically facing the United States which is also a
great power, and a strong ideological influencer.
The second characteristic of middle power is soft power and diplomacy as a usage of
international policy making strategy. Middle power countries tend to have economically
and militarily less strong compared to regional and ideological great powers. Therefore,
they tend to find their niche area that that can successfully penetrate and achieve their
12

goals as strong influence of their soft power and usage of diplomacy as an effective tool to
negotiate with their counterparts. South Korea has a clear example of diplomacy. Lee
mentions in his article South Korea as New Middle Power Seeking Complex Diplomacy, that
“South Korea pursues strong alliance diplomacy with the United States on the one hand and
balanced multilateral diplomacy on the other” (Lee, 2012). The United States has been
South Korea’s primary ally in trade, military, and democratic ideology since the end of the
Second World War and Korean War. South Korea pursue alliance diplomacy because since
the Korean War, the United States provided military supports and led South Korea to win
the current amount of territory in Korean peninsula without losing it all to North Korea and
China allied forces. Since then, South Korea and the United States stayed as security allies
and once South Korea achieved economic development, they became important trade
partners to each other. Because South Korea pursues an export-oriented economic policy,
diplomacy and trade negotiations with great power allies like the United States and China
are important survival strategies for South Korea.
Furthermore, Mo states that “First and primarily, South Korea (unlike great powers)
defines its role largely as an intellectual or soft power contributor” (Mo, 2016). To
strengthen Mo’s argument, Cooper et al. argue that “middle powers provide the intellectual
and political energy to trigger an initiative and take the lead in gathering followers around
it” (Cooper et al., 1993). The descriptions are true to South Korea’s behaviors as a middle
power in East Asia. South Korea began to spread its culture in the late 1990’s through a
phenomenon called the “Korean Wave” (hanryu). Through the Korean Wave, South Korea
started exporting its TV dramas, movies, and music to China (Cho, 2005). Starting with
China, South Kore now exports its cultural products to many East and Central Asian
13

countries including Japan, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan. Spreading Korean culture through
entertainment materials became one of the strong cultural integration and diplomatic
strategy of South Korea. In current days, almost twenty years the beginning of Korean
Wave, South Korean dramas, movies, pop music, and even cosmetic and fashion products
are being exported to South Korea’s neighboring countries.
Middle power capacity is not only in the realm of soft power, cultural cooperation,
and ideological balancing. Scholars also argue that middle powers could have an important
role in maintaining international security and promoting international cooperation. The
last characteristic of middle power country is provider of security and supporter of
international rule of law. Spero argues that after the Cold War, South Korea and Poland
established new alignments because of their new leaders’ decisions. The leaders of South
Korea and Poland chose to develop more state-to-state bilateral and multilateral alliance
systems to decrease existing regional security dilemmas (Spero, 2009). Spero also states
that middle power countries are pivotal “bridging countries” in regional security (Spero,
2009). This assessment can also match South Korea’s profile as it is serves as a pivotal
country in regional security. South Korea is located next to North Korea that threats the
regional and world security by developing nuclear missiles and testing them regardless of
pressures from international society. South Korea is also a neighboring country of China.
China is South Korea’s number one trade partner but ideological adversary since South
Korea is a democracy and an ally of the United States. South Korea also has tight economic
interdependencies and security alliances with Japan and the United States. Based on
underlying sentiment and rivalry in East Asia, South Korea serves as a buffer zone that
borders unstable North Korea backed by a communist regime, China. South Korea as a
14

middle power country in East Asia, ensured its foreign policy to not favor either side to the
other and not be hated by any of its allies (Spero, 2009).
With respect to institutions, Lee suggests the concept of “middlepowermanship”
which describes tendency behaviors of middle power countries that pursue multilateral
solutions to international problems. Middle power countries also “embrace positions in
international disputes or adopt the notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide its
diplomacy (Lee, 2012).” The concept of “middlepowermanship” sums up the middle power
country’s characteristic of provider of security and international order. According to Mo,
South Korea behaves as an international system supporting middle power by encouraging
activism, promoting open trade and multilateralism, and embracing strong rule of law
within South Korea (Mo, 2016). Mo’s argument is supported by the fact that South Korea
has diplomatic relationships with 190 countries, is a member of the United Nations since
1991 and became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in 1996. Furthermore, South Korea hosted Olympic Games twice in
1988 and 2018, and a World Cup Soccer Tournament in 2002. South Korea has been
promoting international order and peace by joining international organizations,
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and hosting international events.
Based on current literature’s categorization of middle power country’s traits, South
Korea fits into most of the characteristics. However, South Korea’s behaviors and
characteristics as a middle power country were based on its diplomacies and relationship
with East Asian neighbor countries, mostly China, Japan, and the United States. Therefore,
in this project, I intend to examine South Korea’s diplomatic, economic and security
relationship with Central Asian republics to assess its behavior as a middle power. This
15

study focuses on the regional variable to determine whether South Korea as a middle
power country act same in different regions. I chose Central Asian republics as case study
subjects because Central Asia is a relatively new region that South Korea has recently been
trying to develop more economic and security relations with through numerous
presidential visits and new initiatives to increase economic ties between South Korea and
Central Asia.
Central Asia is also an appropriate region to study South Korea’s
middlepowermanship because China does have a role in Central Asia as a great power and
influencer of which South Korea needs to be attentive. However, South Korea’s interests
and strategies in Central Asia are not dependent on nor done in reaction to Chinese
economic or security interests. China has been developing its own international
organizations and programs to connect with Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) is an international organization with the members, China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that was founded in 2001 in Shanghai.
Its original purpose was to demilitarize the borders and bring peace to the region, but the
goals have been broadened to military and counter terrorism cooperation and intelligence
sharing (Albert, 2015). The members of SCO expanded to India and Pakistan along with
four observer members: Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia. SCO has six dialogue
partners: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey, and Sri Lanka (Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, n.d.). China’s most recent effort to expand to Central Asia is
through One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. OBOR is proposed in 2013 by China’s
president, Xi Jinping, as a modern way of recreating the Silk Road (Jinchen, 2016). OBOR is
composed of two routes, one as Silk Road Economic Belt on the ground and the other as
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21st Century Maritime Silk Road through ocean. China already made a few bilateral
agreements related to this project with Hungary, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, and Turkey
(Jinchen, 2016). South Korea is neither a country on the list of countries that cooperate
with China on OBOR, nor a cooperating partner of China. South Korea’s initiatives on
cooperation with Central Asia are relatively new compared to China’s projects and that’s
what makes Central Asia open to South Korea. Further, South Korean policies towards
Central Asia are mostly bilateral with each of the five Central Asian republics, and no other
countries are involved. Therefore, South Korea’s policies to cooperate with Central Asian
countries are not dependent or related to Chinese approach of cooperation with Central
Asia.
Based on the current literature’s definitions and characteristics of a middle power
country, I expect to see the following in South Korea’s activities in Central Asia. South Korea
is expected to demonstrate soft power and diplomacy as a usage of diplomatic policies, and
a provider of security and international order as a conduct of international cooperation in
its involvement with Central Asia as South Korea has shown in its relations with China,
Japan, and the US in East Asia. I exclude the geographical and factual characteristics of a
middle power country because the location of South Korea physically cannot be changed
even though the location of its performance changed from East to Central Asia. However,
other two variables, diplomacy and provider of international security can be tested by
examining current relationship between South Korea and Central Asia.
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CHAPTER 3
CENTRAL ASIAN HISTORY AND CURRENT CENTRAL ASIA-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS

This chapter delves into the history and background of Central Asia and China. The
first part will discuss and lay out the history of Central Asian republics and how they
became the countries they are now. The second part of this section describes the
relationship between South Korea and Central Asia; when Korean people started to live in
Central Asia and how Korean diaspora spread into Central Asia which is remotely detached
from South Korea. The last part analyzes contemporary relations between South Korea and
Central Asia.
Central Asian republics that this paper considers consist of five countries:
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Central Asian republics
are located in the south of Russia, east of Caspian Sea, and west of China. Central Asian
republics became individual states after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991 and they have
gone through tumultuous political and economic reforms. Some states were able to have
relatively more stable and peaceful transition from Soviet Union to an independent state
but others did not. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan had stable transition to
independent states; on the other hand, Tajikistan had a civil war from 1992 to 1997 and
Kyrgyzstan had inter-communal conflicts that brought sudden changes in the country
(Fumagalli, 2012)2. The processes of transition to independent states vary in all five Central
Asian states and it may have affected the countries’ economic development in the next 20
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years. Table 3.1. compares the 2017 GDP per capita, population, ethnic diversity, and
physical area of all five Central Asian countries.

Table 3.1. Central Asia profile
Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Turkmenistan

Tajikistan

Uzbekistan

GDP per
capita
(2017 est.)

$26,100

$3,700

$18,700

$3,100

$7000

Population
(2017 est.)

18,556,698

5,789,122

5,351,277

8,468,555

29,748,859

Ethnic groups

Kazakh 63.1%
Russian23.7%
Uzbek 2.8%

Kyrgyz 73.2%
Uzbek 14.6%
Russian 5.8%

Turkmen 85%
Uzbek 5%
Russian 4%
Other 6%

Tajik 84.3%
Uzbek 13.8%
other 2%

Uzbek 80%
Russian5.5%
Tajik 5%
Kazakh 3%

488,100

144,100

447,400

Area sq km
2,724,900
199,951
Source: CIA World Factbook 2017

As Olcott and Cummings describe, Central Asian states were “catapulted to
independence (Olcott, 1992; Cummings, 2012).” From the Soviet Union to new nation
building processes starting in 1991, three issues characterized the new nation building and
issues were intertwined. Fumagalli states that a few noticeable issues came up during the
course of national building process in Central Asia. The first one is the emphasis on the
state-led economic and culture development plans; second, the position of minority groups
who have been living in the region but had to separate because of the new countries
boarders were being created; third, the relationship between the ethnic minority groups
and the new countries they had to integrate within the new state boundaries (Fumagalli,
2009; Fumagali 2012). The new leaders of Central Asian republics were newly elected for
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them to achieve a real meaning of political independence from the Soviet Union. Except for
Kyrgyzstan’s Askar Akaev who was elected as the leader of new Kyrgyzstan was the only
case among the five Central Asian republics that elected a new leader after their
independence. Other four states did not elect new leaders to embrace the idea of
independence and kept the leaders of the each region under the Soviet Union(Cummings,
2012: 61). As independent states, all five states eventually established authoritarian
political systems. Because the Central Asian republics chose to have authoritarian regimes,
the level of corruption was high and the power of governments were perceived
unaccountable by the public (Cummings, 2012). However, the degree of importance of each
government and differences in the government systems vary in all five Central Asian
countries.
As a part of ethnic diversification happened in Central Asia not only ethnic groups
within Central Asia, but also South Kora was involved. South Koreans who live in Central
Asia are mostly known as “Koryo Saram” which means “People of Goryeo.”3 The history
between South Korea and Central Asia begins in 1937 and continues to 1940’s. Korean
people were living near Khabarovsk, which is a city on the Russian side of the RussianNorth Korean border. During the World War II, Soviet union’s suspicion and discrimination
about Korean people stemmed from their hostile relationship with Japan. The Soviet Union
and Japan had been having continuous conflicts from late 1932 until 1939 over border
conflicts (Young, 1967). The series of battels and skirmishes were fought by Union of Soviet

3

Goryeo (also called Koryo): A dynasty in Korean history which lasted from 918 until 1392. Goryeo
dynasty began after Later Three Kingdoms era and before Joseon Dynasty.
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Socialist Republics and Mongolian People’s Republic against Empire of Japan and
Manchukuo. The battles between the Soviets and the Japanese ended in 1939 at the battle
of Khalkhin-Gol (Sella, 1983) with Soviet Union’s victory. After the Soviet Union won the
battles at Khalkhin-Gol, Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed and the Soviets invaded
Poland two days later. Throughout the latter half of the 1930’s, skirmishes between the
Soviets and Japanese continued. But in 1937, Soviet-Japanese relations were eased by
Japanese invasion of China in July.
Mass deportation of Koreans began in September 1937 (Kim, V, 2009) followed by
the start of the second Sino-Japanese war. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, the
Soviets aided China increasing tension with Japan. The Soviets, who were at war with Japan
at the time, became suspicious of Koreans because the Koreans were under Japanese
control, and lived at the border the Soviet Union. Kim writes, “In August 1937, Stalin signed
the infamous Resolution No. 1428-326CC, condemning 171,781 Koreans-the whole Soviet
Korean population of the far East- to deportation to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.” (Kim, V,
2017) Koreans were chosen to be deported to Central Asia, the place that was so remote
and where Soviets sent people for exile. Soviet Koreans, who were forcefully deported to
Central Asia in 1937 were approximately 700,000 across the entire former Soviet Union
and about 500,000 are settled in Central Asia (Kim, G, 1995 and 2000; Fumagalli, 2012).
These Koreans were moved from Khabarovsk, a city in far east close to current day North
Korea, to Central Asia and later Korean people established their own villages in Volgograd
region (Kim, G. N., 2004).
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Ethnic diversity in post-Soviet Union Central Asia was prevalent especially when
ethnic minority groups were forced to be a party of newly created countries that they were
not used to belong to, often times the friction became conflicts. McGlinchey notes that
“ethnically heterogeneous postcolonial societies are thought to be more prone to conflict
and instability than are postcolonial societies dominated by one titular nationality”
(McGlinchey, 2011). Korean ethnic groups were a part of diversified ethnic groups in
Central Asia. Being the first Korean people to settled in Central Asia after the mass
deportation began in 1937, Korean people spread throughout Central Asia but mainly in
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Table 3.2. shows the number of ethnic Koreans in the five
Central Asian republics from 2011 to 2017. It is clear that the majority of Korean
population is concentrated in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan throughout the seven years when
the data was collected. An interesting observation can be made about Tajikistan; Korean
population in the other four countries increased over time or stayed similar but Korean
population in Tajikistan decreased more than 50 percent between 2011 and 2013 and
stayed low.
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Table 3.2. Ethnic Korean Population in Central Asia
Ethnic
Koreans

2011

2013

2015

107,130
105,483
107,613
Kazakhstan
18,230
18,403
18,709
Kyrgyzstan
1,740
744
743
Tajikistan
1,329
1,425
Turkmenistan 884
173,600
173,832
186,186
Uzbekistan
301,584
299,791
314,676
Total
Source: Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs

2017

Percentage
of Korean
Population
in 2017

109,133
19,035
774
1,451
181,077
311,470

0.58%
0.33%
0.009%
0.03%
0.60%
N/A

Estimated %
of total
ethnic
Koreans in
Central Asia
in 2017
35%
6.1%
0.25%
0.47%
58%
100%

Ethnic Korean people in Central Asia did not have easy and prosperous lives. They
had to condition the land so they can grow crops and they were constantly discriminated
against and labeled as “the unreliable” people (Chung and Dibble, 2006). However, Korean
people had no choice but to endure and live in the land they were sent to by Soviet
government. The Korean diaspora to Central Asia that started in the late 1930’s remains
there to this day. Currently, among five Central Asia countries, Uzbekistan has the largest
Korean population of about 180,000 people, Kazakhstan has 105,000, Kyrgyzstan has
18,403, Turkmenistan has 1,060 and Tajikistan has about 640 ethnic Koreans (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2016).
Korean diaspora is most prevalent in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan where the first
group of deported Korean people settled in. Deported ethnic Korean people were forced to
work at kolkhozes, which are collective farms (Kim, V, 2016b; Kim, V, 2017). Ethnic
Koreans worked hard to turn the dried and desert land of Uzbekistan to arable land.
Despite discrimination and false impression of being the “unreliable” people from foreign
land, Koreans sustained their lives and eventually were recognized as a hard-working
ethnic group (Kim, V, 2016).
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Despite the ethnic ties between Korea and Central Asian republics, robust trade
interdependence between the two was lacking for the past twenty years since 1991 until
about 2009. Historically, economic relationships between South Korea and Central Asia
started with establishment of the Silk Road between 9 th and 15th century (UNESCO). Yet
modern history of trading partnership begins in 1992 after the disintegration of the Soviet
Union. Once Central Asian countries gained independence, South Korea and Central Asia
established diplomatic relations (MOFA, 2016). Korea has bilateral trade agreements with
all five Central Asian countries and Uzbekistan has the most robust trade with Korea
reaching $949 million in total trade in 2016. Since 1992, Korea has been conducting
multiple summits of the ROK-Central Asia Cooperation Forum and in 2014 Korea launched
the Eurasia Initiative to promote more robust economic and cultural exchange (Kwon,
2014). Korea is not alone in its steady efforts to build a strong relationship with Central
Asia. China, Russia, and even the United States have been trying to build strong economic
relations with Central Asia as well. After the Soviet Union, Russia remains one of the largest
trading partners of Central Asian countries. Furthermore, China has numerous initiatives
and organizations such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and One-Belt, OneRoad (OBOR) initiative to bolster trade and implement Chinese cultural influence (Hwang,
2016). Even though China is developing its strategies to further expand its influence, South
Korea still can pursue its policy to cooperate with Central Asian republics and strengthen
diplomatic relationship. Current stage of South Korea and Central Asia relationship is not a
competition against China’s SCO or OBOR project and it is unlikely to become a competition
in the future.
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3.1. Current Central Asian Economy
None of the five Central Asian countries have diversified economies. The region is
mostly rich with mineral resources, oil and natural gas, and materials such as coal and
uranium, ferrous metals such as chromium and iron, nonferrous metals such as aluminum,
copper, lead, zinc and gold, and industrial minerals such as phosphate (Laurelle, and
Peyrouse, 2013). Other than minerals, Uzbekistan produces some cotton, and Kazakhstan
produces large amounts of oil. However, products that Central Asian countries can export
are limited. Below is an explanation of each Central Asian country’s imports and exports.
Kazakhstan has the largest trade economy among the five Central Asian countries
with import value of $39.7 billion in 2014 and export value of $64.2 billion in 2014 (The
Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT). The top five countries that Kazakhstan imports
from are Russia, China, Germany, the U.S., and South Korea. Kazakhstan imports from
Russia the most and Russia takes up to 33% of the total import. The second largest
importing country is China with 18%, third is Germany with 6%, the fourth is the U.S. with
5% and the fifth is South Korea with 3%. Machinery/Electrical takes up the largest portion
of Kazakhstan’s imports with 26% of total imports, transportation is 15%, metals are 10%,
chemicals and allied industry is 9% and mineral products are 7%. The top five countries
that Kazakhstan exports to are China, Germany, Russia, France and Romania. Kazakhstan
exports to China the most and China takes up to 15% of total export. The second largest
exporting country is Germany with 9%, third are Russia and France with 8%, and the fifth
is Romania with 5%. Petroleum oils, crude takes up the largest portion of Kazakhstan’s
exports with 59% of total exports, petroleum refined is 6%, radioactive elements are 4%,
petroleum gases and ferroalloys are 3% each (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT).
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Figure 1. Top 5 Exporters to Kazakhstan
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Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT

Turkmenistan has second largest trade economy among the five Central Asian
countries with total import of $6.69 billion in 2014 and total export of $11.1 billion in 2014
(The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT). The top five countries that Turkmenistan
imports from are Turkey, China, Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan imports
from Turkey the most and Turkey takes up to 33% of the total import. The second largest
importing country is China with 14%, third is Ukraine with 6%, fourth is Russia with 5%
and Kazakhstan with 5%. Machinery/Electrics takes up the largest portion of
Turkmenistan’s imports with 33% of total imports, metals are 18%, transportation is 14%,
chemicals are 7% and food stuffs are 4%. The top five countries that Turkmenistan exports
to are China, Turkey, Italy, Germany, and the U.K. Turkmenistan exports to China the most
and it takes up to 82% of total export. The second largest exporting country is Turkey and
Italy with only 5%, fifth are Germany and U.K. with 2%. We observe that most exports go to
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China so the other four countries have trivial impacts. Petroleum gases take up the largest
portion of Turkmenistan’s exports with 82% of total exports, petroleum oils, refined is 8%,
cotton, raw is 5%, petroleum, crude is 2%, and cotton, yarn is 1% (The Observatory of
Economic Complexity, MIT).
Figure 2. Top 5 Exporters to Turkmenistan
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Uzbekistan has import value of $11.6 billion in 2014 and total export of $5.9 billion
in 2014 (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT). The top five countries that
Uzbekistan imports from are China, South Korea, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey.
Uzbekistan imports from China which takes up to 23% of the total import. The second
largest importing country is South Korea with 18%, third is Russia with 16%, fourth is
Kazakhstan with 9% and the fifth is Turkey with 5%. Machinery/Electrical takes up the
largest portion of Uzbekistan’s imports with 27% of total imports, transportation is 15%,
metals are 12%, chemicals and allied industry is 10% and vegetable products are 7%.
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Figure 3. Top 5 Exporters to Uzbekistan
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Kyrgyzstan has total import of $9.32 billion in 2014 and total export of $1.08 billion
in 2014 (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT). The top five countries that
Kyrgyzstan imports from are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and South Korea.
Kyrgyzstan imports from China the most and China takes up to 56% of the total import. The
second largest importing country is Russia with 19%, third is Kazakhstan with 8%, fourth
is Turkey with 5% and the fifth is South Korea with 2%. Textiles takes up the largest
portion of Kyrgyzstan’s imports with 37% of total imports, mineral products are 13%,
machinery/electrics are 8%, transportation is 6% and footwear/headgears are 6%. The top
five countries that Kyrgyzstan exports to are Switzerland, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey and
China. We observed that unlike other Central Asian countries, China is not the largest
exporting market for Kyrgyzstan. Kazakhstan exports to Switzerland the most and it takes
up to 38% of total export. The second largest exporting country is Kazakhstan with 31%,
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third is Russia with 8%, fourth is Turkey with 6% and the fifth is China with 4%. Like
Uzbekistan, gold takes up the largest portion of Kyrgyzstan’s exports with 40% of total
exports, dried legumes are 5%, radioactive elements are also 5%, precious metals are 4%,
and copper waste and scrap is 4% (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT).

Figure 4. Top 5 Exporters to Kyrgyzstan
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Tajikistan has total import of $4.64 billion in 2014 and total export of $679 million
in 2014 (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, MIT). The top five countries that
Tajikistan imports from are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Switzerland. Tajikistan
imports from China the most and China takes up to 53% of the total import. The second
largest importing country is Russia with 15%, third is Kazakhstan with 11%, fourth is
Turkey with 6% and the fifth is Switzerland with 3%. Textiles takes up the largest portion
of Tajikistan’s imports with 22% of total imports, machinery/electrics are 12%, metals are
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9%, mineral products are 8% and vegetables are 7%. The top six countries that Tajikistan
exports to are Kazakhstan, Turkey, Switzerland, Italy, Algeria and Russia. Tajikistan exports
to Kazakhstan the most and it takes up to 25% of total export. The second largest exporting
country is Turkey with 23%, third is Switzerland with 17%, fourth is Italy with 10%, the
fifth is Algeria with 7%, and the last is Russia with 5%. Unwrought aluminum takes up the
largest portion of Tajikistan’s exports with 26% of total exports, gold is 17%, zinc ores are
9%, lead ores are also 9%, raw cotton is 7% and other ores are 5% (The Observatory of
Economic Complexity, MIT).
Figure 5. Top 5 Exporters to Tajikistan
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3.2. Summary
As the statistics show, even though South Korea is not the country that Central Asian
republics trade the most, it is included in one of the top ten trade partners of Central Asia.
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Figure 6 shows continuous increase in volume of trade since 1995 until 2014 between
South Korea and each of the Central Asian republics. Along with the amount of trade, it is
worth analyzing the trend and what kind of goods are being traded. Furthermore, using
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data from World Bank, it is clear that South Korea
and the Central Asian republics trade the complementary products. The data is collected
from 2000 to 2017and the traded products are classified at the 2-digit HS codes. Table 3.3.
represents sector level products that are top ten largest amount of export and import from
a Central Asian republic to South Korea. The amount is represented in $1000USD per year.
Some of the same sectors appeared multiple times in the ten largest trade amount. South
Korea mainly exports vehicles and nuclear reactors, which South Korea has ability to
produce with skilled labor. On the other hand, South Korea imports mineral fuels,
aluminum, iron and steel, which are mostly raw materials and can be extracted as
resources. South Korea and Central Asian trade shows the trend of complementary
economies. Both South Korea and Central Asia export what is abundant for them and
import what is scarce.
Table 3.3. Trade Between South Korea and Central Asia by Sectors 2000-2017
Kazakhstan
Top 10
• Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous
Export
substances, mineral waxes
to South
• Inorganic chemicals; and inorganic compounds of precious metals; of
Korea
rare earth metals, of radio-active elements and of isotopes
• Iron and steel
Top 10
• Vehicles; other than railway or tramway roll stock, and parts and
Import
accessories thereof
from
• Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders
South
and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and
Korea
reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles
• Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts
thereof.
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Table 3.3. Continued
Kyrgyzstan
Top 10
• Aluminum and articles thereof
Export
• Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts
to South
thereof
Korea
• Vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible
• Fruits and nuts, edible; peel of citrus fruit or melons
• Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit,
industrial or medicinal or medicinal plants; straw and fodder
Top 10
• Fabrics; knitted or crocheted
Import
• Plastics and articles thereof
from
• Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and
South
accessories thereof
Korea
Tajikistan
Top 10
• Aluminum and articles thereof
Export
• Raw hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather
to South
• Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts
Korea
thereof
• Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders
and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and
reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles
• Ships, boats and floating structures
Top 10
• Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and
Import
accessories thereof
from
• Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts
South
thereof
Korea
Turkmenistan
Top 10
• Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders
Export
and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and
to South
reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles
Korea
• Cotton
• Apparel and clothing accessories; not knitted or crocheted
• Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and
similar containers; articles of animal gut (other than silk-worm gut)
• Beverages, spirits and vinegar
• Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit,
industrial or medicinal or medicinal plants; straw and fodder
Top 10
• Iron or steel articles
Import
• Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts
from
thereof
South
• Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof; sound recorders
Korea
and reproducers; television image and sound recorders and
reproducers, parts and accessories of such articles
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Table 3.3. Continued
•

Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and
accessories thereof
Uzbekistan
Top 10
• Fertilizers
Export
• Inorganic chemicals; and inorganic compounds of precious metals; of
to South
rare earth metals, of radio-active elements and of isotopes
Korea
• Pulp of wood or other fibrous cellulosic material; recovered (waste and
scrap) paper or paperboard
• Cotton
• Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts
thereof
Top 10
• Vehicles; other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and
Import
accessories thereof
from
• Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances; parts
South
thereof
Korea
Source: World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) data, World Bank
Along with the economic trade, South Korea is recently trying to build more robust
diplomatic relationship with Central Asian countries through specific initiatives. The
examples of these initiatives are New Asia Initiative (NAI) started under Lee Myung-bak
administration and Eurasia Initiative (EAI) which is a follow-up process of NAI and
initiated during Park Geun-hye administration. Through the recent initiatives and its plans
to recreate Korea as hub for connecting Eurasia continent, South Korea is looking to spread
its influence on Central Asia. The next chapter analyzes South Korea’s engagement in
Central Asia as a middle power country. The analysis is on the two initiatives that South
Korea targeted Central Asia, South Korea’s investment with its national companies, and
Central Asian politicians’ sentiments towards South Korea. The analyses aim to see if South
Korea’s engagement can prove its middle power country status outside of its behaviors in
East Asia.
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Figure 6. South Korea’s Trade with Central Asia 1995-2014

Source: Korea Customs Service and Korea Economic Institute
Figure 6 shows the increase of the amount of trade between South Korea and
Central Asia from 1995 to 2014. According to the data, amount of trade between South
Korea, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan increased exponentially over the twenty years. Except
for a small decrease in Tajikistan, throughout the all five Central Asian countries, the trend
of amount of trade with South Korea shows general increase over time.
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CHAPTER 4
KOREAN INITIATIVES TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA

This chapter delves into the history South Korea’s specific initiatives with Central
Asian countries. First, I introduce historical factors of South Korea and Central Asia
relationships. Second, I describe the Comprehensive Central Asia Initiative, New Asia
Initiative, and Eurasia Initiatives. These are the specific initiatives that South Korean
government established to strengthen economic and diplomatic relations between South
Korea and Central Asia and become cooperative partners. At the end of this section, I
discuss how South Korea’s effort to more integrate with Central Asian countries represent
the characteristics of a middle power country. My analysis of South Korea’s diplomacy in
Central Asia shows how the country pursues diplomatic initiatives independent of its
position between or in relation to great powers. This will release the geographical
constraint of defining South Korea as a middle power only based on its behaviors in East
Asia and its regional neighbor countries.
Table 4.1. South Korea-led Initiatives and Their Focuses
Initiative
Comprehensive
Central Asia
Initiative
Korea-Central
Asia
Cooperation
Forum
New Asia
Initiative
Eurasia
Initiative

Start Year
2005

Trade and
Economy
O

System
Supporter
O

Politics and
Diplomacy
O

Soft
Power
X

O

X

O

O

O

X

X

X

O

O

O

O

2007
2009
2013
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South Korea’s diplomacy and its trend in Central Asia is relatively recently
established compared to South Korea’s diplomatic relationships with the United States,
Japan, or other neighboring countries which South Korea established diplomatic
relationship in the 1970s and 80s. Starting in 2009, South Korea began to establish
international initiatives that aim to became economic, social and cultural trade partner of
Central Asian republics (Hwang, 2012). The most recent and effective initiatives are
New Asia Initiative under South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak and Eurasia Initiatives
under Park, Geun-hye. As diplomatic relationships were established between South Korea
and Central Asia and as South Korea’s initiatives started working, the amount of trade
between South Korea and Central Asia increased significantly particularly with Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan during past ten years. South Korea’s investment in Central Asia for
building infrastructures and education facilities like colleges has been increasing as well.

4.1. South Korea – Central Asia effort to cooperate
In a major work on the topic, Calder and Kim (2008) argue that because of Central
Asia’s geographical location and its resources, South Korea would benefit from having a
stronger diplomatic and economic relationship with Central Asia. Geographically, Central
Asia is almost 5,000 kilometers to the west of South Korea. No Central Asian countries
border South Korea and China is located in between the two. Establishing effective security
alliance between South Korea and Central Asia is difficult. Furthermore, since South Korea
does not have any military bases in or near Central Asia, it is almost impossible to have
joint military exercises as security alliances to prevent possible military conflicts in the
region. Because of physical distance and lack of bases between South Korea and Central
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Asia, the possibility and efficiency of the two becoming strategic military alliances is very
low. However, becoming economic and diplomatic alliances is possible for South Korea and
Central Asia because being trade partners and diplomatic allies do not require geographical
proximity to the partners.
Calder and Kim (2008) argue that South Korea and Central Asia are mutually
beneficial economic partners. South Korea is rich in skilled labor and advanced technology.
Central Asia is rich in land and natural capital which South Korea lacks. Within the basic
factors of production – land, labor, and capital – South Korea and Central Asia complement
each other. Central Asia is rich in land and labor, but scarce in capital. South Korea is rich in
capital but scarce in land and labor. More specifically, Central Asia can help Korea to
diversify its resource importers’ markets by providing uranium for Korea’s numerous
nuclear power plants to help Korea to move away from hydrocarbon fuel sources (Calder
and Kim, 2008). Indirectly, a more substantial gain for South Korea is that South Korea can
ultimately generate third-party trade flows by having mediating trading companies that are
only indirectly linked to Korea itself (Calder and Kim, 2008). Positioning itself as a thirdcountry trading partner is important for South Korea for building a positive impression to
Central Asian countries. China, Russia, and even India are located geographically closer to
Central Asia in comparison.
Within Central Asia, Uzbekistan is the most populated country with about 29 million
people and Kazakhstan is the country with the largest oil deposit. Uzbekistan serves as the
transportation hub and the cultural center of Central Asia. The number of ethnic Koreans is
largest in Uzbekistan; 58% of all ethnic Koreans living in Central Asia is in Uzbekistan. This
is a large ethnic Korean population in Uzbekistan compared to other Central Asian
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countries. This stems from the initial deportation of Koreans in 1937. When the Koreans
were deported from the far east to former Soviet states, half of the Koreans were sent to in
current day Kazakhstan and the other half ended up in current day Uzbekistan (V. Kim,
2016). The descendants of deported Koreans settled down in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan
and other Central Asian countries and they still maintain some Korean cultures and rituals
such as national holidays and burial traditions.
Historically, Central Asian countries have been influenced by Russia and China.
Since they gained independence from the Soviet Union, Central Asian countries are seeking
complete autonomy from Russian influence. South Korea may be able to find the niche area
between historical strong influence from Russia and China and Central Asia’s desire to
function as independent states. South Korea can be the first trading partner that Central
Asia voluntarily chooses to cooperate with as an equal. It also remedies Central Asia’s trade
dependence on China. Having South Korea can bring advanced technology, investment in
infrastructure building projects, and promote higher education in Central Asia.
Reflecting their relative importance to the South Korean population and strong
economic complementarity, since South Korea started interacting with Central Asia, its
focus was on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. More recently through the New Asia Initiative
under Lee administration, South Korea started to increase economic cooperation and got
involved in numerous joint projects with these two countries and expand it to others. The
New Asia Initiative was South Korea’s attempt to expand South Korea’s influence
throughout all Asia including South and Southeast Asia as well as Central Asia. South
Korea’s concrete relationship with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan can serve as a foundation
for continuation of diplomatic cooperation in the Central Asia region. Having diplomatic
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cooperation will help South Korea to build strategic partnerships with all five Central Asian
republics in economic and security cooperation as well.
Unlike the New Asia Initiative, the Eurasia Initiative started under the Park
administration focuses on South Korea’s relations with Central Asia only. Despite lack of
geographical proximity, South Korea has been improving its influence in Central Asia
through consecutive “Caravan events”.
Historically, ethnic Korean population is concentrated in Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. These two countries are rich in uranium and oil deposits which gives South
Korea opportunities for investment. With the Eurasia Initiative, South Korea is looking to
expand cooperation with Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan as well as continue
cooperation with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The proof of their effort is one of the 2016
Caravan event host countries is Tajikistan.

4.2. Comprehensive Central Asia Initiative
In December 2005, Korean government launched a Central Asia Conference that
state and private organizations participated (Fumagalli, 2015). The outcome of the
conference was the Comprehensive Central Asia Initiative (CCAI). The CCAI is Korea’s first
strategy toward Central Asia region as a whole. South Korea began their diplomatic
relationship with Central Asia in 1992. At this time, South Korea limited building its
relationships to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the countries with strong economy and
governance compared to other Central Asian countries. The focus has shifted in the recent
years when South Korea finally realized that they needed different sources of oil and
natural gas. The goals of Comprehensive Central Asia Initiative were: “1. Establish a staging
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point in Central Asia for advancement to the Eurasian continent; 2. Secure long-term
supply of energy resources; and 3. Explore a market which will achieve $10 billion in
bilateral trade by 2015 and $5 billion in construction orders” (Ko, 2009).
The South Korean government expected to achieve improvement in bilateral
relations between South Korea and all five Central Asian republics through diplomacy.
Strengthening bilateral and multilateral diplomacy is one of the characteristics of a middle
power country. South Korea has been working to improve diplomacy and chose to have
diplomatic resolutions at the times of conflicts after the Korean War ended in 1953. Since
then, most of South Korea’s diplomatic relations and strategies were evaluated by its
relationship with East Asian neighbors and the United States (Hwang, 2014; Park, 2016;
Snyder, 2012). South Korea’s Comprehensive Central Asia Initiative expands South Korea’s
boundary of robust diplomatic relationship and provides further evidence that South Korea
meets the characteristic of a middle power country by reinforcing strong diplomacy with
Central Asia.

4.2.1. Trade and Economy
Under the CCAI, South Korean government also expected to be a model of economic
development to Central Asian republics. They promoted trades and international
businesses for advance of industries. South Korea explicitly mentioned that “more synergy
effects through closer collaboration between interrelated businesses and advancement of
industries with relative advantage” (Ko, 2009) as one of its future goals.
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4.2.2. System Supporter
South Korea said that “strengthening the legal and systemic foundation for
expansion of cooperative infrastructure” (Ko, 2009) is a core objective of the CCAI. Through
this statement, South Korea demonstrates another characteristic of a middle power
country: the system supporter. System supporter belongs to security and international
order category of a middle power country’s characteristic.

4.2.3. Politics and Diplomacy
Lee Myung-bak indicated that “The previous Roh Moo-hyun administration first
introduced South Korea’s mediating role as a bridge and a hub national under the slogan of
a ‘Northeast Asian Era of Peace and Prosperity’” (Lee, 2012). Therefore, the CCAI was South
Korea’s first modern strategy to expand its cooperation and building a robust diplomatic
relationship with Central Asia. Specifically, South Korea focused on four areas:
“politics/diplomacy, energy/resources, economy and human exchange/culture” (Ko, 2009).

4.3. Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum
The Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum was initiated by South Korean Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2007. The first session was held on November 15, 2007
where government agencies from South Korea, and Central Asian republics met to discuss
about “special opportunities in Central Asia, agricultural cooperation, cultural and
educational cooperation, and trade and investment finance” (Ko, 2009). South Korea aimed
to achieve these goals through ministerial-level bilateral consultations with Central Asian
countries. This forum was significant in South Korea’s relationship with Central Asia
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because it was the first multilateral dialogue channel that was created for promoting
cooperation. Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum was followed up by the New Asia
Initiative that Lee administrative launched.

4.4. New Asia Initiative
New Asia Initiative started in June 2009 as a result of 12 th Korea-ASEAN presidential
meeting. Presidents of ASEAN member countries gathered in Jeju island, South Korea for
the special leaders conference in 2009. This conference reassured that Korea-ASEAN
relations that have been built for the past 20 years. New Asia Initiative will contribute to
strengthening Korea-ASEAN relationship in the future (MOFA, 2010).

4.4.1. Trade and Economy
South Korea focused on trade with Central Asia, especially, energy and resources.
South Korea imports 98% of oil from the Middle East, and recently increased instability of
the region and for means of searching diversified sources of oil and other resource, South
Korea seeks to have Central Asia as the new source of imports.

4.5. Eurasia Initiative
As a follow-up process for Lee’s New Asia Initiative, the Park administration in
South Korea started the Eurasia Initiative. Since New Asia Initiative was an effort to
reintegrate South Korea and other general Asian countries including Central Asia and
Southeast Asia, Park’s Eurasia Initiative is South Korea’s governmental plans that are solely
dedicated to South Korea and Central Asia’s bilateral and multilateral cooperation.
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As a part of the Eurasia Initiative, Korea-Central Asia Caravan events was held from
March 28 through April 1, 2016 in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan with about 100 group of
government officials, businessmen, scholars, and artists from South Korea and the five
Central Asian republics (MOFA, 2016). Caravan events promote political, economic, cultural
mutual understanding and encourages holistic cooperation between Korea and Central
Asia. Historically, these events were held annually; the first one was held in 2011 in
Kazakhstan; the second one was held in 2012 in Uzbekistan; the third one was held in 2013
in Kyrgyzstan; the fourth one was held in 2014 in Uzbekistan and the fifth one was held in
2015 in Turkmenistan. In 2016, the sixth Caravan event was held in Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan (MOFA, 2016). The major theme of 2016’s Caravan event was “promoting crossregional ties amid tension with neighboring North Korea” (The Korea Herald, 2016). In
2016, Korean government prepared the largest Caravan event in efforts to promote and
advertise the Eurasia Initiative hoping that the event would become the starting point of
tightening political, economic, and cultural cooperation between South Korea and Central
Asia (MOFA, 2016). The Caravan event in 2016 had the biggest number of representatives
from South Korea and Central Asia joined including people from Korea Institute for
International Economic Policy (KIEP), policy negotiators from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan,
and 53 performers from Korea who are experts in Korean traditional dances, K-Pop, and
martial arts (MOFA, 2016).
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CHAPTER 5
SOUTH KOREA’S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS
In this chapter I look at the effects of the South Korea-led initiatives with each Central Asian
country. Through analyzing bilateral relationships between South Korea and Central Asian
republics, I focus on middle power characteristics of South Korea in each country.
Descriptions of South Korea’s relations with Central Asian republics summarize South
Korea’s patterns of engagement and evaluate its middlepowermanship. Table 4
demonstrates the characteristics of middle power country used by South Korea in each
Central Asian republic.
Table 5.1. Emphasis on Middle Power Characteristics in South Korea and Central Asian
Republics Relations
Countries
South KoreaUzbekistan
South KoreaKazakhstan
South KoreaTurkmenistan
South KoreaKyrgyzstan
South KoreaTajikistan

Trade and
Economy
O

Development
and Investment
O

Diplomacy

Security

O

X

X

O

O

O

O

O

X

X

X

O

X

O

O

X

X

X

5.1. South Korea – Uzbekistan Relations
South Korea and Uzbekistan started diplomatic relationship in 1992 and since then,
economic exchange between the countries increased tremendously. Therefore, President
Karimov’s 2015 visit to Korea is considered as the continuation of tight economic
relationship between Korea and Uzbekistan and also promoted the New Asia Initiative.
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President Lee also visited Uzbekistan in May as a part of promoting New Asia Initiative in
Central Asia. During the phone calls between Hwang Gyo-ahn, Uzbek President Mirziyoyev
mentioned that he was happy to re-confirm that both South Korea and Uzbekistan are
strongly willing to strengthen strategic and holistic cooperation. He also said that since
independence of Uzbekistan, South Korea became the most trustworthy partner and he is
looking forward to have more cooperation on different issues. Mirziyoyev said that Korean
descendants living in Uzbekistan are working as a bridge to the friendly relationship
between South Korea and Uzbekistan. South Korea and Uzbekistan are planning on
presidential letter exchange, high officials visits, and cultural performances for celebrating
25th year of starting the diplomatic relationship. The both countries look forward to having
deeper understanding between the peoples of the two countries, and deepening
cooperation in broader ranges (Yonhap News Agency, 2017).

5.1.1. Trade and Economy
President Lee Myung-bak and President Karimov from Uzbekistan had a
presidential meeting and talked about co-development of gasoline depository and
improving international trade in agriculture, environment, and culture.
Lee Myung-bak achieved several milestones in terms of South Korea-Central Asia
relationship. Lee and President Karimov signed 16 deals about joint development of
Uzbekistan’s oil fields. According to Uzbekistan president Karimov, “South Korea is an
important partner to the Central Asian republics, and especially to Uzbekistan (Rakhimov
and Sung, 2016).” South Korea is the second largest exporter in Uzbekistan’s economy as
the Figure 3 (Top 5 Exporters to Uzbekistan) shows.
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Uzbekistan president Karimov visited South Korea a year after Park’s visit in 2015.
In May 2015, when Karimov was in Seoul, he signed 60 documents relating to trade,
investment, economic and technical cooperation. These projects and investments worth
U.S. $7.7 billion (Rakhimov and Sung, 2016).
Prime Minister Han Seung-soo had many achievements in Korea and Uzbekistan
relations. Between 2010 and 2016, Han signed a contract to purchase 2,600 tons of
uranium from Uzbekistan that worth $400 million. This is an opportunity for South Korea
to diversify its oil and gas import countries since South Korea used to import uranium from
Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, the United States, and France. Another achievement that
Han made was leading Korea’s state-run company Korea Gas Corp (KOGAS) to take a
contract with its counterpart Uzbekneftegaz, on joint exploration of oil and gas fields in
Chust, Namangan, and Uzunkui regions of Uzbekistan (Ko, 2009).
When Korean Prime Minister Han Seung-soo met with Uzbek Prime Minister
Shavkat Mirziyoev, they agreed that Uzbekistan will give rights to South Korea to explore
A-Distrct of the Amu Darya region. This region is where the largest oil deposit exists in
Uzbekistan. Han and Mirziyoev also agreed that South Korea and Uzbekistan will start a
joint development of molybdenum and tungsten mines 150 kilometers west of Samarkand
(Ko, 2009).
During Lee and Park administration, the Korean government was an important
catalyst between South Korea and Central Asia for signing numerous contracts for projects
and purchasing 2,600 tons of uranium worth $400 million from Uzbekistan (Calder and
Kim, 2008). This amount is about 9 percent of South Korea’s projected annual uranium
consumption.
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5.1.2. Development and Investment
Korea also agreed to invest $17.6 billion in building sewage system and airports in
Navoi. South Korea’s Hanjin Group, parent of Korean Airlines is taking the lead in building
Navoi airport (Calder and Kim, 2008). South Korea and Uzbekistan agreed to move towards
a special relationship (Rakhimov and Sung, 2016). Furthermore, Uzbekistan is willing to
cooperate with South Korea about technological development in Uzbekistan.
Specifically, South Korean companies and agencies directly invested in projects in
Uzbekistan. Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) got involved in building
airports in Tashkent and Navoi for better transportation. South Korea Prime Minister
Hwang Gyo-ahn and Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev agreed on bilateral
cooperation in developing gas channel in Ustyurt Gas Chemical Complex which is located in
Surgil deposits. This project costs about $4 billion.
In September 2015, Korean company LG CNS launched a joint venture in Uzbekistan.
In this investment, LG CNS has the majority of shares of the joint venture and two other
Uzbek companies share the remainder. By doing so, LG CNS still has the right to sway
corporate decisions in favor of South Korea when it is necessary (LGCNS, 2015). The
company focused on the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) with the
Ministry of Development of Information Technologies and Communications (MDITC) in the
Republic of Uzbekistan (Kim, 2015). CNS aims to implement the corporate/individual
database system and a few projects for e-Government. The components of e-government
consist of registration system of the Supreme Court and providing technology experts into
government branches (LGCNS, 2015). Uzbekistan is seeking to develop economy based on
ITC. With LGCNS’s investment and a nation-wide support from Park administration on
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building up business in Central Asia, South Korea and Uzbekistan are willing to continue
the cooperation in bilateral trade and investment.
For education development and aid, South Korea is training small and medium-size
businesses in Uzbekistan. South Korean Inha University built its campus in Tashkent
Uzbekistan in 2014 to provide education on computer science and high-tech engineering
(Rakhimov and Sung, 2016).

5.1.3. Politics and Diplomacy
Lee Myung-bak and Karimov also talked about two countries’ the ways to increase
cooperation and exchange opinions about regional, international politics. Currently, South
Korea focuses on the investment in education, tourism, and cultural exchange, and security.
In 2006, South Korea and Uzbekistan signed a declaration on strategic partnership and
they signed a new Joint Declaration in 2014 while Park was visiting Tashkent (Rakhimov
and Sung, 2016, MOFA, 2015).
On the political side, Lee and Karimov agreed to visit each other’s country on regular
bases to continue to exchange political views about bilateral and global issues that may
affect South Korea and Uzbekistan relations. They also agreed on promoting cooperation
with the UN and other regional and international organizations. According to Ko, “Karimov
highly appraised Korea’s role and efforts in tiding over the global financial crisis as a cochair of the G20 summit conference (Ko, 2009).” Karimov specifically expressed his
positive opinion about South Korea by praising its economic achievement.
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5.2. South Korea – Kazakhstan Relations
As a part of his effort to visit Central Asia, Lee Myung-bak met Kazakhstan president
Nazarbayev. Lee and Nazarbayev agreed to ameliorate bilateral cooperation and improve
the two countries’ relationship as a “strategic Partnership (Ko, 2009).”

5.2.1. Development and Investment
Lee and Nazarbaev signed 10 memorandum of understanding the two countries’
cooperation on energy and resources and development of Jambil maritime oil block in
Caspian Sea as well as a thermal power plant in Balkhash (Ko, 2009). “The two sides will
also hold talks at least once every two years to enhance their cooperation in the
development of nuclear energy. It will include joint planning and construction of small and
medium-sized nuclear reactors.
In Kazakhstan, Korean Prime Minister Han under Lee administration made many
achievements as he did in Uzbekistan. First, he signed contracts that gave South Korea a
right to explore offshore Zambil oil field for a long term supply of uranium. Han also signed
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that gave a chance to South Korea to develop
molybdenum mine with Kazakhstan counterpart (Ko, 2008).

5.2.2. Politics and Diplomacy
Other than economic and energy cooperation, Lee and Nazarbayev also agreed to
work together in fighting the worldwide recession, terrorism and global warming (Ko,
2009).” We can notice from the deals and conversations that Lee and Nazarbaev had as a
part of South Korea’s reaching out to Central Asia and a part of New Asia Initiative, both
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Kazakhstan and Korea want to cooperate in different sectors of businesses to develop
Kazakhstan and supply oil and natural resources for South Korea.

5.2.3. Security
During Lee administration, South Korea and Kazakhstan signed a few agreements
related to security and international peace building. The two countries agreed to proceed
with joint peace and security promotion in Asia especially by encouraging multilateral talks
and conferences such as Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in
Asia (CICA), the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation of Europe (OSCE) (Ko, 2009). South Korea and Kazakhstan agree that increase
in multilateral dialogues is an effective way to increase trust between countries and move
forward cooperation. They thought that Korea-Central Asia Forum contributes to the idea
of promoting peace and practical cooperation of Asian countries (Ko, 2009).

5.3. South Korea – Turkmenistan Relations
South Korea and Turkmenistan relationship has not been as robust as South Korea
and Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan relationship. The reason why there’s not much information
or actions have been done between South Korea and Turkmenistan is not explicitly stated. I
assume not much has been done between South Korea and Turkmenistan is because not
many Korean descendants are living in Turkmenistan in contrast to Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. Another reason might be Turkmenistan might not have stable economy and
political environment for South Korea to safely trade.
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South Korea and Turkmenistan relations accelerated in August 2016 after the two
countries started a diplomatic relationship in 1992. In 2016, Yoon Duk-min, Korean head of
the National Foreign Service met with Akja Nurberdiyeva, Turkmenistan Chairman of
National Assembly to discuss about South Korea-Turkmenistan relationship, both
countries’ diplomatic policies, instability in Korean peninsula, and cooperation in training
diplomats. Yoon perceived that “South Korea and Turkmenistan relationship has been
positively developing in politics, economy, and culture and he hopes this cooperative
relationship between the two countries ameliorate in the future.” (MOFA, 2016) Yoon also
mentioned that he was glad that Turkmenistan endorsed denuclearization of Korean
peninsula following the North Korea’s 4 th nuclear test. South Korea requested more robust
cooperation in establishing security in Korean peninsula.

5.3.1. Trade and Economy
Following Yoon’s meeting with Nurberdiyeva, Lim Sung-nam 1st rank vice foreign
minister participated in 10th Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum and met with
Turkmenistan’s counterpart, Vepa Hajiyev in November 2016. Both foreign ministers
agreed that presidential visits in 2014 and 2015 strengthened the relationship between
South Korea and Turkmenistan. They agreed to have more official meetings and
conferences to discuss about economic and cultural exchange to promote stronger
cooperation between the two countries.
Lim Sung-nam also emphasized that Turkmenistan has world’s 4 th largest natural
gas deposit which will benefit South Korea in trade and economic cooperation (MOFA,
2016). As a part of economic cooperation, South Korean government and Turkmenistan
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government signed a joint agreement on airway businesses in Ashgabat on November 26,
2016 (MOFA, 2016). The two countries agreed to have free airways between the two
countries and have more flexibilities for the airline companies to operate (MOFA, 2016).

5.3.2. Development and Investment
In Turkmenistan, the prime minister consulted on Korean firms’ participation in
that country’s inland and offshore gas fields. He also secured an opportunity to participate
in modernization projects of Turkmenbashi port facilities (Ko, 2009).
Lim emphasized that South Korean companies started to get involved in
Turkmenistan’s infrastructure and energy businesses. Hajiyev hopes to develop more
robust economic ties cooperation with South Korea. Lim assessed that Turkmenistan
hosted the first sustainable transportation conference and has been cooperating with
transportation sector.
Most recently in March 2018, South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs,, Kang
Kyung-hwa, invited Rashid Meredov, Turkmenistan Vice Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs
to have a foreign minister’s conference in March 30. During this meeting, two foreign
ministers plan to discuss about practical regional, and global cooperation including South
Korean companies’ ongoing infrastructure construction in large oil and chemistry sectors
(MOFA, 2018).

5.4. South Korea – Kyrgyzstan Relations
South Korea’s interest in Kyrgyzstan officially documented in 2007. South Korea’s
assessment of Kyrgyzstan was rather harsh than other Central Asian countries because
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Kyrgyzstan’s political corruption, lack of natural resources compared to other Central
Asian countries which slowed down economic development of Kyrgyzstan. Even though
Kyrgyzstan joined WTO in 1998, it was affected by Russian economic crisis in 1998 and
decrease in gold production, which is Kyrgyzstan’s one of the export products (Korean
embassy in Kazakhstan report, 2007). After 2003, Kyrgyzstan focused on electricity
production, agricultural reform, infrastructure building, and IT industry development.
After 2003, its economic growth rate rose up to 7% but it decreased to -0.6% in 2005
because of continuation of political instability, and high oil price.

5.4.1. Development and Investment
South Korea recognizes the potential to develop water power, mining, agricultural
development, residential building construction, tourism, road infrastructure building, and
ICT sector development. However, difficulties still exist because of instability and political
unrest. One of the first Korean industry that invested in Kyrgyzstan despite the hardships is
residential apartment construction company. Artis Global initiated building residential
apartments in Bishkek in September 2006 (Korean embassy in Kazakhstan report, 2007).
South Korean companies invested in tourism industry as well. Lake Issyk-Kul is one
of the most famous sightseeing places in Kyrgyzstan along with Pik Pobedy, Pik Lenin, Khan
Tengri and other mountains and fjord lakes. South Korea is planning to build resorts near
Issyk-Kul lake region as they expect increase in tourist after straight road is built from
Almaty to Issyk-Kul (Korean embassy in Kazakhstan report, 2007). South Korea considers
broadening Kyrgyzstan’s infrastructure, including road building and increase in airlines to
promote more tourism. The difficulty for Korean business to participate in road building is
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that Kyrgyzstan government has not enough funding and Korean companies are not going
to make enough profit compared to Chinese companies with cheap labors who are also
investing in Kyrgyzstan’s road building projects. South Korea is looking to develop more
Information Communications Technology (ICT) industry and it will be worthwhile to invest
in ICT sector because Kyrgyzstan’s ICT industry is developing more quickly than other
Central Asian countries (Korean embassy in Kazakhstan report, 2007).
In 2013, Yoon Byung-se, Minister of Foreign Affairs met Erlan Abdyldaev,
Kyrgyzstan’s counterpart during 68 th UN General Assembly meeting to discuss about
Korea-Central Asia Cooperation Forum that had been planned to happen in Bishkek in
October 2013 and practical business cooperation. Yoon and Abdyldaev specifically
discussed about broadening cooperation in energy, resource development, cooperation in
agriculture, medical, cultural and development. Abdyldaev emphasized the importance of
Korea-Kyrgyzstan Agricultural Center equipped with high technology Greenhouse and
agriculture technology education and showed high interest in continuing cooperation with
South Korea (MOFA, 2013).

5.4.2. Security
South Korea provided humanitarian aid to Kyrgyzstan when Kyrgyz-Uzbek ethnic
dispute occurred in June 2010. During the violent dispute, at least 187 people died, 1966
people were injured and about a million people were internally displaced or became
refugees. South Korean government provided food and medical supplies through UN Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. It is South Korea’s effort to restore peace and
promote security in Kyrgyzstan (MOFA, 2010).
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5.5. South Korea – Tajikistan Relations
In June 2011, Kim Sung-hwan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade met with
Shukurjon Zuhurov, Tajikistan Speaker of the House, to discuss about South Korea and
Tajikistan’s cooperation for ameliorating their relationship. Both parts agreed that the two
countries improved their cooperation in water resource development, agriculture, road
infrastructure building, and ICT development since the two countries started diplomatic
relationship in 1992(MOFA, 2011). Zuhurov reconfirmed that he would work with South
Korea to continue the cooperation businesses in every sector. In 2012, Tajikistan officially
became a member of WTO and in April 2015, Tajikistan Embassy was built in Seoul, South
Korea (MOFA, 2015). Cho Tae-yeol, 2nd vice foreign minister, participated in opening
ceremony of Tajikistan Embassy and met with President Rahmon along with Tajik
nationals living in South Korea. Cho and Rahmon embraced the relationship that the two
countries have built and agreed to continue cooperation (MOFA, 2015).

5.6. South Korea-Central Asia Relationship Summary
As we can see, South Korea has significantly larger trade and cooperation history
and investment in different sectors of businesses in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan compared
to Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. A few variables can explain these differences.
First, many more ethnic Koreans live in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan because of historical
reasons discussed before. Second, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have larger economy (higher
GDP per capita) compared to the other three (add tables). Third, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan have comparably stable political environment than Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan where violent ethnic disputes, ongoing civil wars until recent years, and
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threat of terrorism especially in Tajikistan. Despite the differences in level of cooperation
and trade, when representatives from South Korea and all five Central Asian countries
meet, they tend to agree that bilateral cooperation has been developing and strengthening
since the diplomatic relationship was established in 1992. Even though the level of
robustness in cooperation varies in each Central Asian country, it is clear that South Korea
is pursuing middle power diplomacy in Central Asia through promoting economic
development, security of the region, and soft power diplomacy using cultural exchange. The
next section analyzes more in detail what aspects of middle power diplomacy that South
Korea is pursuing in Central Asia.
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CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Through analysis of South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents, academic
papers, and other news articles, I explained initiatives that South Korea started to connect
with Central Asia, and South Korea’s bilateral relationships with each of the five Central
Asian republics. As a middle power country, South Korea focused on developing economic
and diplomatic aspects in their key initiatives. With the Comprehensive Central Asia
Initiative, South Korea promoted trade and international businesses, and positioned itself
as a mediator and a promoter of Northeast Asia’s peace. The New Asia Initiative focused on
economics, and particularly the energy and resources sector. Lastly, the Eurasia Initiative
covered many aspects of South Korea and Central Asia relationship including economy,
politics, security, and cultural cooperation. Increase in trade amount between South Korea
and Central Asia from 1995 to 2014 is one clear evidence that reflects South Korea’s effort
to develop tighter and more cooperative relationship with Central Asia.
Observing bilateral relationships between South Korea and each five Central Asian
republics, it is important to notice that South Korea performed the characteristics of a
middle power country described in academic literature. In South Korea and Uzbekistan
relations, the South Korean government emphasizes the spheres of Trade & Economy,
Development & Investment, and Politics & Diplomacy. Uzbekistan is the country that South
Korea has the most cooperative and strongest relationship with among the Central Asian
republics. South Korea has 16 deals with Uzbekistan about joint oil field development, large
amount of imports and exports, and $17 billions of investment in infrastructure building.
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South Korean companies such as LG and Hanjin are stationed in Uzbekistan to conduct
infrastructure building and oil and gas field exploration.
Kazakhstan has South Korea’s second largest investment and cooperative
relationship among the five Central Asian republics. In Kazakhstan, South Korea focused on
Development & Investment, Politics & Diplomacy and Security aspects of the bilateral
relationship. South Korean president Lee Myung-bak and Kazakhstan president
Nazarbayev agreed to joint develop oil blocks and confirmed South Korea’s investment in
energy and resources. It is worth noticing that security aspects of South Korea and
Kazakhstan relationship because Kazakhstan systematically endorsed joint peace and
security promotion in Asia through international measures such as CICA, ACD, and OSCE.
South Korea’s relationship with Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are not as
strong as South Korea’s relationship with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. But the emphasis on
the Trade & Economy, Investment, and Politics & Diplomacy is the same as South Korea’s
emphasis on relationship with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In Turkmenistan, South Korea
agreed to invest in airway businesses and investment in natural gas deposits. Economic
and cultural exchange and strengthening cooperative relationship between South Korea
and Turkmenistan is also promoted. In Kyrgyzstan, South Korea invested in infrastructure
building and IT industry development. South Korea also recognizes the potential to develop
water power, mining, and agricultural development in Kyrgyzstan along with tourism
industry. South Korea and Tajikistan relationship is still in the begging stage. The two
countries agreed to continue cooperation in water resource and agricultural development
as well as infrastructure building and IT industry investment.
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For an additional understanding on South Korea and Central Asian republics’
relations, I analyzed data from the GDELT project on global database on events, language,
and tone. I gathered data from 2000 to 2017 to analyze the changes on number of articles
and the tone of languages. To get the perspectives from the both sides, I gathered data
reported from South Korea about the five Central Asian republics and I also gathered data
reported from the five Central Asian republics about South Korea. The types of events that
reports depict is measured by Goldstein scale (Goldstein, 1992). The Goldstein scale is a
measure of how positive or negative bilateral relations are on a scale from -10 to 8.3; -10
being extremely hostile events such as military attack and 8.3 being extremely friendly
events such as extend military assistance. Figures 7 and 8 portray changes in tone and
number of articles over time using loess trend line that is calculated from all individual
events.
From South Korean reporting on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, I observed that
average tone of articles became more hostile over time when the number of articles
increased. From South Korean reporting on Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,
average tone of articles became more friendly when the number of articles decreased.
From Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan reporting on South Korea, the
average tone of articles became more hostile over time when the number of articles on
South Korea increased. From reports from Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, the average tone of
articles became more friendly when the number of articles about South Korea decreased.
Both South Korea and Kazakhstan used more hostile tone about each other and the
number of articles increased. Tone of South Korea’s reports on Kyrgyzstan became more
hostile but Kyrgyzstan’s tone on South Korea became more friendly over time. Both South
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Korea’s reports on Tajikistan and Turkmenistan became more friendly but Tajikistan and
Turkmenistan’s tone about South Korea became more hostile. Lastly, both South Korea’s
reporting on Uzbekistan and Uzbekistan’s reporting on South Korea became much more
friendly over time when the number of articles decreased.
Figure 7. South Korean Report on Central Asia

Source: GDELT Project
As we see in Figure 7, tone of articles (represented in green line) about Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan became more hostile over time in South Korea when the number of articles
(represented in red line) increased. According to the analysis, it can be inferred that South
Korea paid more attention and reported more about Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan but the
contents of articles became more hostile over time. By contrast, the tone of articles about
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan became more friendly when the number of
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articles decreased. It can be inferred that Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were
not in the center of South Korea’s attention, but the tone of article became more friendly
over time. The crossover between number of articles and the tone of articles happens
around 2011.
Figure 8. Central Asian Report on South Korea

Source: GDELT Project
As we see in Figure 8, tone of articles about South Korea became more hostile over
time in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan when the number of articles
(represented in red line) increased. According to the analysis, it can be inferred that
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan paid more attention and reported more about
South Korea but the contents of articles became more hostile over time. In Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan by contrast, the tone of articles (represented in green line) about South Korea
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became more friendly when the number of articles decreased. In these two countries, they
reported less about South Korea and it can be inferred that South Korea was not in the
center of their attention, but the tone of article became more friendly over time. The
crossover between number of articles and the tone of articles happens around 2011. Given
that in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, South Korea was one of the top five trading
partners, economic relationship between South Korea and Central Asian republics may not
have a positive correlation.
As we can see from the cooperation measures, despite the difference in robustness,
South Korea generally has constructive relationship with Central Asian republics. Countries
like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have longer history of cooperation. Specific projects of
South Korea and its investment sectors are clearly stated in Korean Ministry of Foreign
Affairs documents. South Korea has relatively weaker relationship with Turkmenistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan but the potential to broaden the cooperation and more
investment opportunities for South Korea are present. There are some generalization
about the South Korea-Central Asia relationships to be made: South Korea concentrates on
Trade & Economy, Energy & Investment, and Politics & Diplomacy aspects of relationship.
All of these traits that South Korea demonstrates are characteristics of a middle power
country. South Korea is defined as a middle power country in current political science
literature. South Korea was commonly judged by its location and diplomatic behavior
among geographical and political neighbor countries which are the United States, China,
and Japan. Through the analysis of South Korea’s relationship with Central Asia, it is right
to say that South Korea behaves as a middle power country outside of East Asia. East Asia
has been the location where South Korea’s middle power diplomacy was shown.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The purposes of this paper were: First, to test if South Korea truly behaves as a
middle power country outside of East Asia using the case study of South Korea and Central
Asia relationship; Second, to define middle power country’s characteristics more clearly. If
South Korea is a middle power country, then I expected to see the characteristics of a
middle power country defined in literature in South Korea’s relationship with Central Asia.
To test the hypothesis, I collected government documents from Korean Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, academic articles, and reputable news articles to see what South Korea has done in
relations to Central Asia. After analyzing the documents, I concluded that South Korea has a
cooperative and complementary relationship with all five Central Asian republics despite
the differences in degree of cooperation. From South Korea’s relationship with Central Asia,
it is clear that South Korea concentrates on Trade & Economy, Energy & Investment, and
Politics & Diplomacy aspects. These aspects commonly appear in South Korea and Central
Asia relationships. Therefore, to determine if a country is a middle power country, its
location, economic status, do not matter much but how a country behave cooperatively in
relation to the countries it interacts with matters more significantly. In sum, South Korea
truly behaves as a middle power country outside of East Asia. A middle power country’s
characteristics can be more narrowly defined as a country that focuses on Trade &
Economy, Energy & Investment, and Politics & Diplomacy aspects in its relationship with
other countries.
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For further research to more embellish the argument of this paper, I suggest three
other possible data collection options. First, it will be helpful to collect reports from
governments of the five Central Asian republics to cross examine the validity of South
Korea’s middlepowermanship in the region. Second, conducting a text analysis on South
Korea’s opinion about the five Central Asian republics, and Central Asia’s opinion about
South Korea from 1991 to present to strengthen the argument about why South Korea and
Central Asian relationships are cooperative. Third, this paper shows that South Korea has
more robust cooperative relations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and not so much with
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. I can speculate the difference is coming from the
number of Korean descendants living in each country, economic advancement, and
government stability can be the factors of difference in level of cooperation. Further
research can be done to verify the reasons of the different cooperation levels and its
implications on South Korea and Central Asia relations.
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